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Bankruptcy
by Honorable John T. Laney, III* and Nicholas Greer**
This year's Bankruptcy Law Article surveys both opinions and recent
legislation that will have an impact on the practice of bankruptcy law in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.1 The
decisions in this article come from the Supreme Court of the United
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
United States District Courts located in the Eleventh Circuit, as well as
the United States Bankruptcy Courts located in the Eleventh Circuit.
Throughout the survey period, January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019,
countless decisions related to bankruptcy law have been handed down
by these courts; this article will focus on and address those decisions
found in the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court that the authors
feel will have the greatest impact on bankruptcy law.
Additionally, this year saw new bankruptcy legislation passed by
Congress and enacted into law. This Article will discuss the most
impactful of the new legislation: a new subchapter of Chapter 11 that
establishes what many believe will be a quicker and more efficient
process for qualifying small business debtors and their reorganization
plans.
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*United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1964); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1966). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1964–1966); Co-Editor in Chief (1965–1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**Law Clerk to The Honorable John T. Laney, III. Kennesaw State University (B.S., 2016);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2019). Member, Mercer Law Review (2017–2019);
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For a discussion on opinions from 2018 that impacted bankruptcy law, see Hon.
John T. Laney, III & William J. Diehl, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 70 MERCER
L. REV. 865 (2019).
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I. CASES
A. Taggart and the "objectively reasonable basis" for civil contempt

139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019).
Id. at 1799.
11 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2019).
Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1799.
11 U.S.C. § 727 (2019).
Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1800.
Id. (quoting In re Ybarra, 424 F. 3d. 1018, 1027 (9th. Cir. 2005)).
Id.
In re Taggart, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4850 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 9, 2011).
Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1800.
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Perhaps the most important bankruptcy case from the survey period,
Taggart v. Lorenzen,2 comes from the Supreme Court of the United
States. Taggart considers the standard a court should follow when
determining whether "a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for
attempting to collect a debt that a discharge order has immunized from
collection."3 Taggart centered on a Chapter 74 debtor, Bradley Taggart.
Taggart owned an interest in a company, Sherwood, and liquidated the
interest at some point prior to filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code. This resulted in Sherwood bringing claims
against Taggart for violation of their operating agreement. 5 After
Taggart received a discharge under § 727,6 Sherwood sought to recover
for Taggart's violation of the operating agreement in an Oregon state
court. The Sherwood defendants received a verdict in state court and
then sought a new claim for attorney's fees. 7 Under the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit precedent, a former debtor who
has received a discharge order would be protected from post-petition
attorney's fees for prepetition litigation "unless the discharged debtor
'returned to the fray' after filing for bankruptcy." 8 The Oregon state
court determined that Taggart had indeed returned to the fray and, as a
result, awarded nearly $45,000 in attorney's fees to Sherwood. 9
Taggart, with his bankruptcy discharge in hand, returned to the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon to seek damages
against the Sherwood defendants for contempt for violating Taggart's
discharge injunction, believing that his actions did not constitute
"returning to the fray."10 The bankruptcy court agreed with the state
trial court, concluding that there was no violation by Sherwood of
Taggart's discharge and that Taggart had returned to the fray and,
therefore, was liable for the attorney's fees. 11
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Id. (quoting In re Taggart, 522 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 16, 2014)).
Id. at 1800–01.
Id. (quoting In re Taggart, 888 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018)).
Id. at 1801.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 524 (2019).
11 U.S.C. § 105 (2019).
Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)).
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Upon appeal, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon agreed with Taggart and remanded the case back to the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court held Sherwood in civil
contempt by applying a "strict liability" standard, finding that
Sherwood "had been 'aware of the discharge'" and "'intended the actions
which violate[d]' it."12 On appeal, both the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
for the Ninth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated the decision of the bankruptcy court. 13 The Ninth
Circuit utilized a different standard for contempt, holding that "a
'creditor's good faith belief' that the discharge order 'does not apply to
the creditor's claim precludes a finding of contempt, even if the
creditor's belief is unreasonable.'" 14 Using this standard, Sherwood's
"good faith belief" that Taggart's discharge "did not apply" to
Sherwood's claims invalidated the civil contempt sanctions and thus,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the vacation by the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel.15 At this point, Taggart filed a petition for certiorari to ask the
Supreme Court whether "a creditor's good-faith belief that the
discharge injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil
contempt."16
The Supreme Court decided to hear the case and sought to determine
the "legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt when the
creditor attempts to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge
order."17 The Court then looked to § 52418 and § 105,19 two separate
provisions of the bankruptcy code, for direction.20 Section 524 states
that a "discharge order 'operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of an action . . . or an act, to collect,
recover or offset' a discharged debt."21 When the Supreme Court
reconciled that provision with § 105, which authorizes a court to issue
orders and judgments necessary to carry out the Bankruptcy Code, the
Court determined that a bankruptcy court does indeed have the
authority to impose civil contempt sanctions "when there is no
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22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1128 (2018)).
24. Id. (quoting Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389
U.S. 64, 76 (1967)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1803.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1804.
30. Id. at 1799.
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objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct
might be lawful under the discharge order."22
The Supreme Court also employed a "long-standing interpretative
principle" by considering that "when a statutory term is 'obviously
transplanted from another legal source,' it 'brings the old soil with it.'" 23
Looking at historical context, the Court held that the language found in
the aforementioned provisions such as "operates as an injunction" or to
"carry out" brings the "old soil" that is the "potent weapon" of civil
contempt.24 That "old soil" represents the traditional use of civil
contempt as a means to control the conduct of parties before the court. 25
Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned that despite the Bankruptcy
Code's not explicitly granting unlimited authority to hold creditors in
civil contempt, the use of such language incorporates the "old soil" that
is the traditional use of civil contempt. 26 Justice Breyer then considered
Taggart's argument: that a finding of civil contempt would be proper
when the creditor was aware of the discharge order and still chose to
act in a manner that violated the order.27 The Court ultimately
determined that such a standard was too close to strict liability as it
would employ foregoing a creditor's subjective beliefs about the
discharge order and disregard the potential existence of a reasonable
basis for the creditor's conduct.28
The Court concluded the opinion by stating that the Ninth Circuit
"erred in applying a subjective standard for civil contempt" and then
ruling that "a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a
discharge order where there is not a 'fair ground of doubt' as to whether
the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order." 29
Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the strict liability standard for civil
contempt and instead announced a standard that considers whether
there was an objectively reasonable rationale for creditor's conduct in
terms of violating a discharge order.30
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B. In re Thompson and the "lack-of-knowledge" requirement

939 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1281.
11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) (2020).
11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) (2020).
Thompson, 939 F.3d at 1281.
Id.
11 U.S.C. Ch. 13 (2020).
11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 (2020).
Thompson, 939 F.3d at 1281.
Id. at 1281–82.
Id. at 1282.
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One important case in the Eleventh Circuit during the Survey period,
Thompson v. Gargula,31 featured the United States Trustee's seeking
revocation of a discharge after learning that the Debtor had failed to
report the acquisition of estate property.32 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit essentially whittled the case down to
one question: "whether a 'lack-of-knowledge' requirement that is
explicitly contained in one subsection of the bankruptcy statute, 11
U.S.C. § 727(d)(1),33 can be read into the adjacent subsection of the
same statute, 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2),34 thereby barring revocation."35
Choosing not to rewrite the bankruptcy code, the Eleventh Circuit
instead affirmed the decisions of both the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and did not read the
"lack-of-knowledge" requirement into a subsection that did not already
include such language.36
The Debtors initially filed a Chapter 13 37 petition, then five months
later voluntarily converted their case to Chapter 11, 38 then almost two
years later voluntarily converted their case to a Chapter 7. While the
case was making its way through the judicial process, a former
employee of the Thompsons "submitted a fraud referral to the Trustee"
that alleged the "stockpiling" of cash, trips, and plastic surgeries.39 Just
over a year after receiving a discharge, the Trustee filed an adversary
proceeding against the Debtors requesting the revocation of their
discharge as a result of her investigation into the fraud referral. The
Trustee asserted that the financial reports filed by the Debtors were
"incomplete, inaccurate, or erroneous."40 The Debtors, however, moved
for summary judgment on the matter arguing that the "Trustee was on
notice of the alleged fraud before the bankruptcy court entered the
discharge, barring the Trustee's claim for revocation."41 Using § 727(d),
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the bankruptcy court denied in part and granted in part the Debtor's
motion for summary judgment.43 Section 727(d) states that a court
"shall revoke a discharge . . . if—"
42

(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and
the requesting party did not know of such fraud until after the
granting of such discharge; [or]
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or
became entitled to acquire property that would be property of the
estate, and knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the
acquisition of or entitlement to such property, or to deliver or
surrender such property to the trustee.44

05/29/2020 07:30:56

42. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (2020).
43. Thompson, 939 F.3d at 1282.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1)–(2) (2020).
45. Thompson, 939 F.3d at 1282.
46. Id. at 1282.
47. Id. at 1282–83.
48. Id. at 1282 (quoting Yerian v. Webber (In re Yerian), 927 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
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According to subsection (d)(1), a bankruptcy court has the power to
revoke the discharge when the requesting party, the Trustee, "did not
know of such fraud until after the granting of such discharge." 45 Here,
the Trustee was aware of the potential fraud prior to the granting of the
discharge and therefore, subsection (d)(1) was not applicable. This
language is what is considered as the "lack-of-knowledge" requirement;
when a party moving for revocation of a discharge lacked the knowledge
of fraudulent conduct by the Debtor, § 727(d)(1) allows for the expedient
grant of such revocation.46
With that said, § 727(d)(2) does not contain language that would
amount to a "lack-of-knowledge" clause. Instead, this subsection has a
list of criteria that the bankruptcy court determined matched the
Debtor's conduct in this case. 47 After the bankruptcy court revoked the
discharge and the district court affirmed, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting
"as a second court of review and thus examin[ing] independently the
factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and
employ[ing] the same standard of review as the district court," reviewed
the bankruptcy court's decision.48
The appellate court began its analysis in much the same way as the
bankruptcy court: by reviewing § 727(d)(1) and § 727(d)(2). To
circumvent the "lack-of-knowledge" requirement in (d)(2), the Debtors
argued that in order for (d)(2) to apply, the Trustee must still prove that
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Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284 (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2020).
Thompson, 939 F.3d at 1285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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she lacked knowledge of the alleged fraud by using the same standard
spelled out in (d)(1). To accompany this position, the Debtors also
argued that the legislative history of the bankruptcy code and, more
specifically, the subsection in question implemented a lack of knowledge
requirement into (d)(2).49 The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that
these arguments were "unavailing" and that "[t]he statutory text and
statutory—not legislative—history are dispositive."50 Thus, the court
turned to statutory interpretation to further consider the Debtors
argument: "Where Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."51 With this in mind, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
despite Debtors' argument involving legislative history and
necessitating an inquiry into the potential existence of laches, the
Supreme Court had made clear that courts must "refrain from reading a
phrase into the statute when Congress has left it out." 52
Next, the Debtors argued that the disclosure requirements placed on
a Trustee in § 704(a)53 create a lack of knowledge requirement in
(d)(2).54 The court swiftly shut this argument down, writing that even if
a Trustee is expected to disclose knowledge of fraud in such statements,
the disclosure would not serve to disallow a later revocation.55
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court
and the district court and, after a statutory analysis, found that because
Congress included a "lack-of-knowledge" clause in the first part of the
subsection, (d)(1), and not in the second part of the subsection, (d)(2), it
was improper to read such a clause into the subsequent subsection. 56
Doing so would impair Congress's intent when drafting the statue. As a
result, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to create new law and instead
provided an unambiguous holding for an unambiguous subsection. 57
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C. Roth and § 524's effect on "Information Statements"
In Roth v. Nationstar Mortgage,58 the Eleventh Circuit considered a
case that originated from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Florida which, for seemingly the first time, allowed
the federal appeals court to implement Taggart's earlier ruling.59 The
Eleventh Circuit considered whether Nationstar violated the court
ordered discharge in an attempt to collect a debt; additionally, the court
considered whether to apply the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) standard, 60 the "least sophisticated consumer."61
The case began like most other bankruptcy cases. The Roths filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and received a discharge; this discharge
included a mortgage which had been transferred to Nationstar and
Nationstar was notified of the discharge.62 The discharge order granted
to the Roths was standard and contained language such as
the discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt
that has been discharged. For example, a creditor is not permitted to
contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a
lawsuit, to attach wages or other property, or to take any other action
to collect a discharged debt from the debtor.63

935 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1272–73.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–1692p (2020).
Roth, 935 F.3d at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The discharge order also included language that allowed a Debtor to
voluntarily pay a discharged debt, as well as language that would allow
a creditor to still have a right to enforce a lien on the property in
question "if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy
case."64
Shortly after the Roths received a discharge order from the
bankruptcy court, Nationstar began sending monthly statements
referencing the mortgage—despite the mortgage having been
discharged less than six months earlier. These monthly statements
stated that the letter was not an attempt at collecting a debt but the
statement itself still included information such as amount due, due
date, and directions to provide Nationstar with the payment. After
filing for sanctions in the bankruptcy court alleging a violation of § 524,
as well as a separate action alleging a violation of the FDCPA,
Nationstar and the Debtors agreed to settle the claim. Nationstar,
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65. Id.
66. Id. at 1273–74.
67. Id. at 1274.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The Roths also argued that the bankruptcy court's decision not to allow an
evidentiary hearing was improper and raised that issue on appeal as well. Id.
71. Id. at 1275 (quoting Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801).
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however, continued to contact the Debtors. 65 Nationstar began sending
"informational statements" with the same information as the previous
statements and included a disclaimer stating that the statement was
sent "for informational purposes only and [was] not intended as an
attempt to collect, assess, or recover a discharged debt." 66
The Debtors then filed a suit against Nationstar in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that
Nationstar's conduct violated the FDCPA. Nationstar argued that the
informational statement was not sent for the purpose of debt collections
which the district court, after applying the FDCPA's "least
sophisticated consumer" standard, denied. The parties then reached a
settlement for the FDCPA claim. The Debtors also, however, filed a
second motion for sanctions in the bankruptcy court, again alleging
Nationstar violated the discharge order.67 The bankruptcy court
disagreed with the debtors, finding "the 'informational statement' was
not a debt collection attempt, and therefore was not in violation of the
§ 524 injunction."68 The Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's
decision to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the
bankruptcy court, and then appealed the decision to the Eleventh
Circuit.69
The Debtors' contention on appeal, inter alia, was that the
bankruptcy court incorrectly denied the second motion for sanctions
against Nationstar because of differing interpretations of § 524.70 The
appellate court began its opinion by looking at the utilization of § 105 to
punish violations of § 524: "[t]ogether, sections 524(a)(2) and 105(a)
'authorize a court to impose civil contempt sanctions [for attempting to
collect a discharged debt] when there is no objectively reasonable basis
for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the
discharge order.'"71 Continuing with explaining the standard with
which to determine potential violations of discharges and subsequent
sanctions, the Eleventh Circuit again quoted Taggart: "[i]n this way, 'a
court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge
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Id. (quoting Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1799) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1276 (quoting In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015)).
Id. (quoting In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1322).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1322).
Id. at 1276–77.
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order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred
the creditor's conduct.'"72
With this newly minted standard in mind, the Eleventh Circuit
sought to determine whether Nationstar's letters amounted to a
prohibited attempt at a debt collection by considering "whether the
objective effect of the creditor's action is to pressure a debtor to repay a
discharged debt."73 Looking to the communication sent to the Debtors
by Nationstar, the court held that there are "several bases" for
determining that "the objective effect" of the communication was not "to
pressure [Roth] to repay a discharged debt." 74 The informational
statement sent by Nationstar contained a disclaimer, printed in bold
and on the first page, stating that the communication was for
informational purposes only.75 The disclaimer then states if the account
"has been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding" the communication is
"for informational purposes only" and "is not an attempt to collect a
debt."76 Reasoning that because § 524 contained a provision which
allowed a debtor to voluntarily pay back a discharged debt, the court
determined that inclusion of details such as "amount due" and "due
date," along with balance information, did not "diminish the effect of
the prominent, clear, and broadly worded disclaimer." 77 If such
informational statement were prohibited, the court reasoned, there
would not be any other way for Nationstar to inform the Debtor of how
to reacquire its collateral.78 Therefore, because the informational
statement sent by Nationstar contained an obvious disclaimer that
removed the potential for such communication's being an attempt at
collecting a debt, the Eleventh Circuit held the informational statement
was "not designed to have the 'objective effect' of 'pressur[ing] the
debtor to pay a discharged debt.'"79
The Debtors then asked the court to incorporate the "least
sophisticated consumer" standard from the FDCPA into § 524 for
purposes of discharge violations.80 The appellate court rejected this
suggestion despite Debtors' argument that the mechanics of both
sections are "designed to protect the same vulnerable parties from the

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 23 Side A
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same improper conduct."81 Determining that there is a difference
between the FDCPA and the bankruptcy code, the court held that the
functions of the two laws are different; the FDCPA "seeks to help
consumers" while the bankruptcy code "by way of contrast, creates and
maintains what we have called the delicate balance of a debtor's
protections and obligations."82 After concluding that neither statute
suggests the employment of such standard in a § 524 context, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the Debtor's argument to do so. 83 In
conclusion, because the court held that the informational statements
were not attempts at debt collection under § 524, the court had no need
to determine whether the newfound Taggart standard for § 105 applied
to the case at hand.84
II. LEGISLATION
A. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019
Signed into law in August 2019, the Small Business Reorganization
Act of 2019 (SBRA)85 sent shockwaves across the bankruptcy industry—
at last, an avenue carved out for small business owners to seek the
potential benefits a reorganization plan may bring without having to
journey into a "one-size-fits-all" approach that Chapter 11 had
previously been viewed as. Unlike the other three bankruptcy bills
signed into law on the same day, 86 the SBRA included an enactment
clause that delayed the new law from taking effect until February 19,
2020. This new law seeks to expedite the process of Chapter 11 plans
for small business debtors, resulting in quicker resolution and lower
attorneys' fees.87
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 23 Side A
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81. Id. at 1277.
82. Id. (quoting Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1414–415 (2017)).
83. Id. at 1277–78.
84. Id. at 1278.
85. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, Aug. 23, 2019,
133 Stat. 1079, § 5 (2020).
86. The other three bills signed into law were: (1) the National Guard and Reservists
Debt Relief Extension Act of 2019, which extended an exemption for an additional four
years from the means-test presumption of abuse for qualifying members of the Armed
Forces and National Guard called to active duty after September 11, 2001 for not less
than 90 days. H.R. 3304. (2) The Honoring American Veterans in Extreme Need (HAVEN)
Act of 2019, which excludes certain benefits earned by veterans from being considered as
current monthly income under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). H.R. 2938. (3) The Family Farmer
Relief Act of 2019, which increased the aggregate debt limit for filers who may be
considered "family farmers" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) to $10,000,000. H.R. 2336.
87. Pub. L. No. 116-54.
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88. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 §§ 1181–1195.
89. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 § 1187.
90. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 § 1188.
91. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 § 1189(b).
92. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 § 1183(c)(1). The United States
Trustee still has the power to reappoint a trustee when necessary, such as for
modification or when the debtor is removed from possession, despite the trustee's having
been terminated due to substantial consummation.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2020).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1).
95. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 §§ 1181–1195.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2020).
97. Id.; Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, Aug. 23,
2019, 133 Stat. 1079, §§ 101, ¶ 2 (2020).
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The Act adds new language, now subchapter V, 88 and begins by
requiring a debtor who wishes to qualify as a "small business debtor"
for the purposes of filing under the new subchapter V to make such
election at the time of filing the petition.89 Upon electing to be a
subchapter V debtor, the debtor faces an accelerated timeline including:
filing a pre-conference status report at least fourteen days prior to a
mandatory status conference which must be no later than sixty days
after entry for relief.90 Additionally, no later than ninety days after the
order for relief, the debtor must file a plan and then there must be
twenty-eight days' notice to allow for creditors to determine whether to
accept or reject and file objections to the proposed plan. 91
Interestingly, subchapter V does not contain provisions for creditors'
committees or require disclosure statements; additionally, if there are
no objections to confirmation, a trustee only serves until the plan has
been substantially consummated. 92 A trustee shall be appointed by the
United States Trustee and, according to the statute, will be
compensated under 28 U.S.C § 586,93 the same statute that outlines
how current Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 trustees are paid. 94 Overall, it
appears that a trustee operating under subchapter V cases will work
similarly to that of their Chapter 12 and 13 counterparts—to facilitate
the reorganization process and represent the interests of the United
States Trustee.95
In conclusion, as stated previously, subchapter V was created to
accelerate reorganization plans for small business debtors who qualify.
A small business debtor under the plan is one who has at least 50% of
debt arising from commercial or business activities and whose debts do
not exceed the maximum amount found in § 101(51D), 96 currently
$2,725,625 with other exclusions. 97 The Act seems like it will make the
bankruptcy process more accessible for small business debtors—there
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are no disclosures, no committees, and no absolute priority rule to take
into consideration. This new law can and likely will make filing such
plans more cost efficient for small business debtors and allow them the
opportunity to seek the fresh start that the bankruptcy code exists to
offer. However, because it is a new law and as such, a new procedure
unfamiliar to both judges and attorneys, there really is no way to truly
understand how subchapter V will affect the bankruptcy bar until cases
begin to be filed and the courts have an opportunity to hear arguments.
Until then, we will simply appreciate the efforts made to streamline the
bankruptcy code as well as the attempts to alleviate some of the
potential difficulties faced by small business owners.
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